Hamas’s resistance doctrine is making it harder to broker a deal

By Amir Asmar

As the war in Gaza approaches its tenth month, there is palpable desperation on the part of the Joe Biden administration to end the conflict and its attendant political consequences. So far, the administration has struggled to justify its near-unconditional support of the Israeli government in light of the tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians dead and wounded—particularly to elements of the Democratic Party and to Arab-Americans who will play a critical role in several battleground states in the upcoming presidential election. On the flipside, the administration has angered staunch supporters of Israel by criticizing Israel’s conduct in the war, its restriction of humanitarian assistance to Gaza civilians, and its continued rejection of postwar planning. President Biden’s latest plan to end the war—attributed to the Israeli government and presented on May 31—drew Israeli equivocation and Hamas amendments that were deemed unacceptable by senior administration officials.

Apart from indifference to the US president’s political struggles, there are a number of reasons why Hamas is not jumping at Biden’s proposal. First and foremost, Hamas is an Islamist organization, and its resistance to Israel is riddled with rigid religious principles that permit no operational or strategic half-measures. Hamas’s 2017 chartercharacterizes Palestine—congruent with the mandate—as highly esteemed in Islam, probably due to its unique holy places. Hamas argues that Palestine is both the spirit and central cause of the ummah (Islamic community), and that Islam values standing up to aggression. In Hamas’s characterization, Israel is a colonial project imposed by force, and its settlement and Judaization of the country are illegitimate. Conversely, it sees all means to advance the struggle against Israel as legitimate. Escalating, de-escalating, or diversifying the means of the conflict are integral to the conduct of the fight. Much recent reporting reduces Hamas to its terrorist identity, rather than evaluating the group as a whole. Presenting an offer that Hamas would accept requires a full understanding of how the group perceives itself in the context of broader Islamic principles.

Second, Hamas clearly intended to alter the sclerotic state of the Palestinian pursuit of independence, much as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did when he initiated a military assault and subsequent diplomatic initiative to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli occupation on October 6, 1973. With regard to Palestinian statehood, prior to the October 7, 2023 attack, the Israelis were unreceptive, the corrupt Palestinian Authority was ineffectual, and the United States was disinterested. By conducting the brutal attack, displacing Israelis, highlighting Israel’s intelligence and military shortcomings, and promoting regional instability—both directly and via its allies Hezbollah and Iran—Hamas has gained the United States’ focus, if not Israel’s, on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although not on Hamas’s terms. As long as the Gaza war goes on, despite significant battlefield losses, Hamas is stoking Israeli anxiety by holding its hostages, displacing its civilians, engaging its troops in deadly battle—with more than three hundred Israeli troops killed in ground combat as of mid-June—and making the status quo ante more difficult to restore.

Third, Hamas leaders understood that Israel would, as it has countless other times, respond disproportionately to Hamas’s attack and inevitably lose the worldwide sympathy it gained on October 7, 2023. Apart from the latest Gaza Health Ministry numbers of some thirty-eight thousand killed and at least eighty-five thousand injured, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, and the Palestinian government estimate that, as of June 30, Israeli attacks had damaged 80 percent of Gaza’s commercial facilities, 88 percent of school buildings, and 267 places of worship, while half of Gaza’s thirty-five hospitals were only partially functioning. Hamas’s use of civilian facilities for operational centers and weapons caches is bait to which Israel routinely rises with minimal regard for civilian casualties. So the longer the war continues, the more likely it is that Israel will continue to suffer worldwide approbation to Hamas’s and the Palestinians’ benefit, as was demonstrated by Norway, Ireland, and Spain recognizing Palestine as a state on May 22. As Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s military leader in Gaza and the architect of the October 7 attack, recently said, “We have the Israelis right where we want them.” According to the Wall Street Journal, Sinwar also described Palestinian civilian deaths as “necessary sacrifices,” citing past high-casualty Arab independence conflicts like Algeria’s.

Fourth, Hamas understands that it has leverage over Israel due to the roughly 120 hostages it continues to hold, including those believed to be dead, and its readiness to continue the conflict. Conversely, the leverage Israel holds—its ability to kill Palestinians, both militants and civilians, and to destroy infrastructure—is a sacrifice Hamas and other groups are manifestly willing to accept. Though it desires an end to the war, Hamas is working to extract the maximum benefits it can, including denying Israel the “complete” victory Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu keeps vainly promising. Hamas leaders likely assess they can outlast the pressure on Israel’s government to secure the release of the hostages. They have set the price for the hostages’ release to be the complete end of the war, including Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and, by extension, Hamas’s continued involvement in Gazan affairs. On June 20, Israeli military spokesperson Daniel Hagari rejected the notion that completely eliminating Hamas was a realistic war aim, a statement that signaled growing tension between Netanyahu and Israel’s security establishment—a tension that Hamas has no doubt also noted. There was never a possibility of a Hamas military victory, but Sinwar and other leaders are fervently pursuing a political triumph that remains within reach.

For all these reasons, Hamas is unlikely to agree to any terms to end the Gaza conflict unless Sinwar assesses they represent the maximum “victory” he can extract. The recent Biden offer, designed to satisfy Israeli equities, continues to fall short. Sinwar spent decades in Israeli prison, learned Hebrew, studied Jewish history, and extensively examined Israeli media to better comprehend his adversary. Whether his decision-making regarding the conflict is sound or not, the Biden administration should not expect Sinwar’s acceptance of an offer Hamas assesses it can improve upon merely by holding out. Hamas views its resistance as religiously mandated, and nine months of military and political pressure have not altered its position.

The article was originally published here.

Amir Asmar is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.