From Dushanbe to Berlin: The emerging ISIS-K threat

By Morgan Tadych

Although the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) was officially defeated by coalition forces in 2019, its offshoot branch focused on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia has recently pursued high-profile attacks outside of the region. Central Asian nationals, particularly Tajiks, carried out many of the recent Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) attacks and plots in Europe and the United States, suggesting that systemic issues in Tajikistan allow for significant terrorist recruitment. Addressing some of these systemic issues through Western engagement and economic support to Dushanbe may reduce ISIS-K’s ability to recruit from Tajikistan and ultimately decrease the group’s ability to conduct external operations.

ISIS-K seeks to establish a caliphate and expand beyond what it labels Khorasan, or Central and South Asia—and the group demonstrated its capability and intent to do so through a series of successful attacks in early 2024. In January and March of this year, ISIS-K conducted three separate mass-casualty attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia, killing hundreds of civilians. These attacks turned the spotlight on ISIS-K’s growing ability to conduct external operations, especially in Europe, and demonstrated the expanding threat that the group poses to the West. This summer, ISIS-K and individuals associated with and inspired by the group threatened to attack the Cricket World Cup, which took place in New York; the Paris Olympics; and the European Soccer Championship. Interestingly, each of these threats was phrased in such a way as to encourage an ISIS-inspired, lone-wolf actor to conduct the attack.

ISIS-K published the calls to action through its English-language magazine, Voice of Khorasan, which began publication in 2022. The English-language Voice of Khorasan is disseminated through various social media channels, particularly on Telegram, and is intended to spread ISIS propaganda to a Western audience. In the Mayedition of Voice of Khorasan, ISIS-K published a photo of a fighter standing in a German soccer arena, inviting its members to “score the last goal.” In June, following this call to action, German authorities arrested an ISIS-K-linked individual who intended to work at the Euro Cup soccer finals. That individual was likely a lone-wolf actor, but his pursuit of employment at the Euro Cup immediately following ISIS-K’s call to action underscores the realistic possibility of attacks against soft targets in the West.

To date, ISIS-K’s attacks against Western targets have involved suicide bombs and gunmen. Still, there are concerns that future attacks may be more sophisticated and conducted by dispersed cells, which are harder to deter. For example, one of ISIS’s recent English-language calls to action included a detailed manual explaining how to adapt commercially available drones to carry explosives—instructions that a sympathizer circulated in terrorist social media channels. This vignette encapsulates the use of new technologies in attack planning, which can result in an attack that could be carried out from a standoff distance. Furthermore, it demonstrates cyber-coaching, a term that describes ISIS-K’s strategy of providing guidance and support to cells of fighters from a distance. Cyber-coaching allows senior Afghanistan-based ISIS-K members to provide attack planning guidance and coordination from afar, potentially expanding ISIS’s reach and ability to plan and conduct attacks against Western targets. 

ISIS-K’s cyber-coaching has enabled the group’s Europe-based sympathizers to plan attacks locally, often using communication apps, like the walkie-talkie simulator Zello or the encrypted chat app Telegram, and cryptocurrencyapps that are common in their areas. In 2020, for example, German officials disrupted a plot against US military facilities in Europe. For this attack, senior Afghanistan-based leadership provided “radical lectures” to a cell of Tajikistani nationals in Germany via a messaging app. The group’s ability to conduct and inspire attacks through cyber-coaching almost certainly enables its burgeoning capability to conduct external operations.

As with the 2020 plot in Germany, Tajiks frequently conduct ISIS-K attacks outside of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Tajiks were involved in all three of the group’s major 2024 attacks, and over a dozen have been arrested on terrorism charges in the United States and Europe this year alone. The quantity of terror-related arrests of Tajiks in the West indicates the emphasis ISIS-K has placed on recruiting from the tiny Central Asian country. This recruitment trend has become even more pronounced over the last year.

In March, ISIS’s media arm published the first edition of its Tajik-language online magazine, also titled Voice of Khorasan, which included topics such as the history of the caliphate and contact information for individuals seeking to join the jihad. The publication of Voice of Khorasan in Tajik highlights the expanding role Tajiks play in ISIS-K’s external operations and the importance to the group of recruiting these individuals. The group’s leader, Sanaullah Ghafari, is himself Tajik and seeks to expand recruitment through Central Asia by leveraging flashy, high-profile attacks.

While it is not precisely clear why ISIS-K seeks to radicalize young men, specifically from Tajikistan, to conduct its external operations, a host of domestic problems—such as systemic poverty, limited religious freedom, and a lack of social mobility—plague that country. These factors can leave individuals feeling disenfranchised and push them towards radical beliefs, including terrorism, as an outlet for finding meaning in life. These conditions also drive thousands of Tajiks to become migrant workers abroad, where they often face discrimination, cramped living conditions, and low pay—all of which can further build an environment for radicalization to terrorism. There is evidence that these migrants have radicalized both inside and outside of Tajikistan, with some joining extremist Islamic groups in their new countries. Many Tajik migrants can legitimately claim economic refugee status to access Western nations, and these individuals can blend into immigration flows into Europe via Ukraine and into the United States via the Southern border and pose a terrorism threat to their new countries.

Addressing these issues within Tajikistan, especially by countering systemic poverty and the lack of economic opportunities, may present one vector for reducing recruitment for ISIS-K and potentially diminish the group’s ability to conduct external operations. Decreasing the number of Tajikistani economic migrants—and the associated opportunities for overseas recruitment—could ultimately decrease the number of potential terrorists from the region. Research from Nigeria demonstrates the impact of human rights fixes—including foreign assistance—on reducing the number of individuals joining Boko Haram, an ISIS affiliate. Although this research focused on attacks within Nigeria, the solutions and reductions in radicalization applied there may have strong parallels with the situation Central Asia. Additionally, diplomatic counterterrorism solutions, including US engagement and information sharing with regional governmental authorities, may present an avenue to increase pressure on ISIS-K.

Although US engagement with Dushanbe may help reduce ISIS-K’s ability to recruit, the situation is complicated by the fact that Tajikistan and Russia share a long history. Moscow considers Central Asia within its sphere of influence and has historically pressured Central Asia to curtail engagement with the West. (Moscow is also uneasy with China’s economic clout in the region.) Recently, however, Tajikistan has meaningfully engaged with Western nations on a wide variety of topics, including security, economic, and environmental issues. In the last several years, Tajikistan has pursued significant foreign engagement independently of Russia, and these emerging partnerships have proven beneficial for the country. For example, the US Agency for International Development recently introduced a substantial economic and environmental aid package for Tajikistan, and the Virginia National Guardheld training exercises with the Tajikistani military—neither of which attracted Moscow’s attention. Building upon existing successful partnerships with Dushanbe presents the best framework for US efforts to reduce ISIS-K recruitment in Tajikistan.

ISIS-K’s recruitment focus on Central Asia, specifically in the impoverished nation of Tajikistan, underscores the group’s desire to expand its ability to conduct attacks in the West. While there is no reliable, timely data on the number of Central Asians the group has recruited, the recent arrests of Tajiks for overseas plots suggest a strategy of relying on these men, many of whom are economic migrants, to carry out attacks in the West. Furthermore, the group’s emphasis on attracting fighters from Tajikistan suggests that there are several pathways for reducing recruitment and deterring overseas attacks, including increased Western engagement to help lift Tajikistan from poverty and traditional counterterrorism measures like information-sharing with regional authorities. As these Tajik men continue to travel overseas, they are likely to increase ISIS-K’s ability to achieve its stated goal of expanding its caliphate and killing infidel Muslims, Christians, and Jews. This goal, combined with the group’s three successful attacks, multiple disrupted plots in 2024, and expanded recruitment attempts, highlights the potential for the group to develop into a major counterterrorism problem.

This article was originally published here.

Morgan Tadych is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) professional and Army veteran. She spent much of her military career researching strategic Russia/Eurasia issues and deployed to conduct counterterrorism missions.